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Limited Liability, Asymmetric Taxation, and Risk Taking -Why Partial Tax Neutralities Can Be Harmful -
Introduction
Liability-related issues are often regarded as one of the main reasons for the current financial crises. As an example, mortgage debtors in the U.S. who give real estate as a security for a loan can get rid of the mortgage if they hand over the real estate to the lender, even if the current value falls short of the nominal debt. As a result, mortgage debtors can be held liable only to a limited extent. Banks which "securitize" loans and do not retain a fraction of these securities for their own account are another example of limited liability. In the case of default, these banks do not suffer losses although they impose substantial risks on their trading partners. The trading behaviour of investment banks − which are typically subject to limited liability − has been described by the metaphor "picking up nickels in front of a steamroller". Obviously, limited liability provides additional incentives for risk taking by creating a convex cash flow structure.
The treatment of losses is closely related to liability issues. If investors take risks and conditions turn sufficiently unfavourable, losses may occur. Then the question arises to what extent these losses can be used for tax purposes. Current tax systems are characterized by loss-offset limitations, creating concavities in the after-tax cash flow structures.
Rational investors can anticipate limited liability as well as loss-offset restrictions when making their decision on the amount of risk they want to bear. Thus, investors are facing a combination of tax-and non-tax asymmetries of the cash flows. On an ex ante basis, it is not clear which combined incentives are induced by these multiple asymmetries on risk taking.
In Business Taxation, it is often argued that taxation should be neutral with respect to a firm's legal form. Proponents of legal-form-tax-neutrality point out that every taxpayer should be taxed considering the financial results of its economic activity 1 . This requires a uniform taxation regardless of a firm's legal form. Since different legal forms face different liability rules, it remains an open question which risk taking incentives are induced by an equal tax treatment of losses incurred by firms of different legal forms. Moreover, we ask whether legal-form-tax-neutrality is compatible with tax neutrality regarding risk taking. More generally, we analyze whether different partial tax neutralities are congruent or conflicting tax policy objectives.
We consider a risky investment with a risk level to be chosen by the investor. We assume that there is an individually optimal risk level in a world without taxation under full liability. This symmetric case serves as the reference case for the effects of tax-and non-tax asymmetries. We show that proportional income taxation with loss-offset limitations reduces the optimal risk level. By contrast, limited liability -as a parameter reflecting a firm's legal formenhances the incentives for taking risk. The final decision about the risk level is affected by a combination of loss-offset restrictions, the degree of limited liability, and the tax rate.
Our results indicate that risk-taking-tax-neutrality is not compatible with legal-form-taxneutrality. Risk-taking-tax-neutrality requires asymmetric taxation under limited liability and symmetric taxation under full liability. Thus, we show that partial tax neutralities do not necessarily provide guidance to overall tax neutrality.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a review of the tax literature on risk taking and limited liability. Section 3 illustrates the structure of our model. Furthermore, we examine the incentive effects induced by asymmetric taxation and limited liability. Section 4 analyzes conditions for risk-taking-tax-neutrality. The results are illustrated with some numerical examples in section 5. Section 6 summarizes the results and provides a critical discussion of the model assumptions. We conclude with a perspective on further research questions.
Literature review
The tax impact on risk taking has been a focal issue of public finance and business tax research for decades. In their seminal paper, Domar / Musgrave (1944) prove that risk taking strongly depends on loss-offset rules. Improving loss-offset opportunities results in higher risk taking. Mossin (1968) generalizes the Domar / Musgrave results by means of expected utility theory. Näslund (1968) uses mathematical optimisation and Russell / Smith (1970) use criteria of stochastic dominance in their analyses of taxes and risk taking. Richter (1960) , Stiglitz (1969) , Allingham (1972) and Sandmo (1989) also use the risk-utility-theory to analyze the impact of taxation with and without loss-offset on the demand for risky investments 2 . These articles can be attributed to the public finance literature. Research in business taxation gained similar insights 3 .
In the following decades, asymmetric taxation was examined intensively. Important contributions to the public finance literature in this area were Barlev / Levy (1975) , Auerbach (1986) , Auerbach / Poterba (1987) , MacKie-Mason (1990) , Eeckhoudt / Gollier / Schlesinger (1997 ), van Wijnbergen / Estache (1999 and Panteghini (2001a Panteghini ( , 2001b Panteghini ( , 2005 . The empirical relevance of loss-offset regulations is clarified by Altshuler / Auerbach (1990) , Mintz (1988) as well as by Shevlin (1990) . Their results are examined using effective tax rates.
Real-world loss-offset regulations often induce a path dependence of investment decisions. Thus, in many cases analytical results for investment models cannot be obtained. Therefore, numerical methods are necessary for the assessment of investment projects. Numerical simulations were realized by Majd / Myers (1986) and Majd / Myers (1987) . Since the 1970s Monte-Carlo-simulations have been used for the evaluation of loss-offset limitations in the German literature 4 .
The analysis of loss-offset regulations is not restricted to public finance research. The regulations are examined in the finance literature as well. For example, Ball / Bowers (1982) , Cooper / Franks (1983) , Majd / Myers (1986) , Majd / Myers (1987) , Schnabel / Roumi (1990), and Lund (2000) emphasize parallels between a call option and the treasury's tax claim.
Since the 1940s neutral tax systems under certainty have been derived by Brown (1948) , Preinreich (1951) , Samuelson (1964) and Johansson (1969) , for instance. Neutral tax systems under uncertainty were proved later by Hartman (1978) , Fane (1987) , Buchholz (1988) , Bond / Devereux (1995) . Under risk neutrality, such neutral tax systems have already been derived in a real option context by Sureth (2002) , and Niemann / Sureth (2005) as well as under risk aversion by Niemann / Sureth (2004) .
Neutral tax systems mainly require a proportional tax rate and symmetric taxation of profits and losses. Loss-offset limitations induce violations of tax neutrality. Moreover, most models of capital budgeting with taxes implicitly assume that investments are carried out by individuals rather than corporations, because these models consider only one taxpayer rather than a combination of individual and corporate taxation. The taxation of partnerships in many countries corresponds to this assumption. By contrast, a comprehensive analysis of tax effects in corporations requires the integration of individual and corporate taxation as well as assumptions about the profit situation and corporate dividend policy. Because of its practical relevance limited liability has been examined in law and economics for a long time. These analyses especially focus on the relationship between shareholders and creditors of corporations. Obviously, risk neutral decision makers with limited liability prefer risky investments. Sinn (1980) and Golbe (1988) show that these results are particularly relevant for companies close to default ("gamble for resurrection"). Gollier / Koehl / Rochet (1997) Becker / Fuest (2007) distinguish between companies with full loss-offset and companies with restricted loss-offset.
The impact of taxation on the decision between insolvency and merger with solvent companies is analyzed by Bulow / Shoven (1978) . They show that asymmetric taxation favors mergers. The reason is that loss carry-forwards are lost in the case of insolvency or liquidation. By contrast, taxation of highly positive profits induces the opposite effect and tends to favor insolvency or liquidation.
In this paper we examine the simultaneous effects of tax-and non-tax asymmetries in the investment's cash flow structure on the individually optimal risk level. We derive a substitutional relationship of limited liability and loss offset restrictions.
Model design
3.1 Benchmark situation: Tax-free case with full liability
We consider a one-period model with a risk-neutral investor. The investor has an initial wealth denoted by I. He puts his entire initial wealth in an investment project with a risk level to be chosen. The project's expected rate of return v depends on the chosen risk level r:
. In addition, the realized rate of return is a function of the stochastic variable ε% .
Assuming a sufficiently well-behaved risk-return function v, there is an individually optimal risk level * r in the tax-free case with full liability:
If r = 0, the rate of return v(r) corresponds to the risk-free interest rate z. Increasing r initially leads to an increased expected rate of return. The expected rate of return reaches its unique maximum at r*. Subsequently, the expected rate of return decreases 9 . The risk level r can be Using the above definitions, the investor's expected future value W in our reference case can be easily computed as:
Obviously, the expected future value is maximized if ( ) v r is maximized. Thus, r * represents the investor's optimal risk level in the symmetric benchmark situation.
9 Assuming that increasing risk requires additional effort by the investor, this effect can be interpreted as a result of the investor's increasing and convex disutility associated with higher effort induced by higher risk.
Symmetric taxation with full liability
We use a uniform tax rate s for all kinds of capital income. The rate of return μ % is subject to the same tax rate, regardless of the chosen risk level. Tax-exempt income and non-deductible expenses do not exist. Therefore, tax base and tax rate effects cannot occur under symmetric taxation.
Symmetric taxation does not alter the individually optimal risk taking r * , because a multiplication by the factor (1 ) s − does not change the optimality properties of the expected rate of return. Hence, symmetric taxation does not distort risk taking if the investor is risk neutral 10 . This effect can be easily verified by computing the expected future value after symmetric taxation:
Asymmetric taxation with full liability
We implement a tax-induced asymmetry in the form of a loss-offset limitation. This is the first step in a gradual introduction of several asymmetries. Positive profits are subject to the full tax rate s. For losses, i.e., for ( )
only a limited or no tax refund applies. This is formally displayed by a loss-offset parameter 1 γ ≤ . This parameter represents the proportion of deductible losses. As a result, γ is regarded as a tax policy variable. By adjusting γ , the tax legislator can change investors' willingness to realize risky investments.
Under asymmetric taxation, the tax base TB is defined as: 10 This result is distorted by risk aversion. See Domar / Musgrave (1944) . 11 In most jurisdictions the use of losses for tax purposes depends on the amount of losses. Losses that cannot be offset against current profits must be carried forward to subsequent periods, which induces a negative time effect. The higher a loss, the later it can be offset against future profits. In our notation, this effect would imply that the loss offset parameter γ would be a function of ε :
The relationship of the realisation of the random variable ε and the investor's future value W(ε) can be easily illustrated graphically:
Future value under symmetric and asymmetric taxation as functions of the random variable ε
The solid line illustrates the future value under symmetric taxation. In the case of loss-offset limitations, the future value is described by the dashed line. The two lines coincide for
Asymmetric taxation concavifies the future value function. Therefore, the decision on risk taking is probably influenced by similar effects as the concave utility function of a risk-averse decision-maker.
The expected future value considering asymmetric taxation is given by: 
require extensive assumptions regarding future profits, which are difficult to explain in a one-period model.
Hence, we assume γ to be constant. A one-period model does not permit time effects of taxation. As a consequence, we have to approximate time effects by tax base effects.
The inequality arises because of
To determine the optimal risk level under asymmetric taxation r , the following first-order condition must be met:
It can be shown that the relation r r * ≤ applies. Because of v´(r * ) = 0 the following inequality holds at r * :
( ) ( )
Thus, r * cannot be an optimum. To show that * < r r , we use the second partial derivative of s r W with respect to r, which is negative:
(1 ) 
As a result, asymmetric taxation under full liability decreases the willingness for risk taking.
It should be noted that this result is still based on the assumption of risk-neutral behaviour.
Pre-tax case with limited liability
If the investment project's rate of return falls short of -100%, i.e. if ( )
, a liability exemption implies that a reserve liability as under unlimited liability cannot occur. This means that zero is a lower boundary for the investor's future value. Thus, negative future values are not possible. With regard to a meaningful analysis of limited liability, we assume that this case has a strictly positive probability:
( )
In the case of partially limited liability, the reserve liability will not be completely removed. This variation can be interpreted as an insurance with proportional retention. The compensation by the insurance is a fraction of 0 1 β ≤ ≤ of the "damage". Equivalently, the investor has a proportional retention of ( ) Within the scope of trade and company law, regulations on liability are at the legislator's discretion. Hence, β can be regarded as the legislator's action variable. In addition, β can be interpreted as a tax policy action variable.
The conditional future value for a risky investment amounts to: Therefore, an incentive for higher risk taking can be expected.
The explicit formal analysis confirms this conjecture. Now, the expected future value is: 2. The loss-induced tax reimbursement must be paid to cover losses until the net future value equals zero. This is the case for sole proprietors or for partners of partnerships who are legally facing an unlimited liability, but whose net wealth might not be sufficient to cover all obligations. Case 1 corresponds to the situation of corporation shareholders and is independent of the initial wealth. Case 2 just matches with the situation of partners of partnerships if this investment is the investor's only asset. Otherwise, the other components of the investor's wealth would have to be considered in the calculation, too. However, in this case, the character of a partial analysis would be lost. Since we focus on the typical liability rules for the different legal forms, we will analyze case 1 only.
In this case, the future value as a function of μ is given by 12 : 12 In order to avoid a multitude of subscripts and superscripts, the expected future value under symmetric (asymmetric) taxation with limited liability is denoted by W 1 (W 2 ).
(1 (1 ) ) (1 )(1 ) for 1 ( ) 1 (1 ) for 1
As in the pre-tax case, limited liability increases the incentives for risky investments under symmetric taxation. This can be easily verified for 
) 0
At the point * = r r the inequality ( )
holds. Consequently, the optimal risk level exceeds the one from the symmetric case again:
The impact of the tax rate on the optimal risk level is negative: Hence, the higher the tax rate, the lower the optimal risk level.
Asymmetric taxation with limited liability
In this section we combine tax-and non-tax asymmetries. Therefore, the future value is a piecewise linear function of the pre-tax return μ (or the random variable ε , respectively) and is kinked twice. 
The future value will be exactly sI γ if the rate of return equals -100%. This future value corresponds to the tax shield given a total loss of the initial wealth. For losses exceeding this value, the future value depends on the liability parameter β . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
The main trade-offs are obvious and result from the isolated effects of asymmetric taxation and limited liability. It depends on M(r) and N(r) and hence on the risk-return function ( ) v r , the probability density function ( ) f ε , the tax rate s , the loss-offset parameter γ , and the liability parameter β , whether the combined asymmetries lead to increased or decreased incentives for risk taking.
Neutral tax systems
The trade-off between loss-offset limitations and limited liability implies that there should be a loss-offset-liability combination that leaves the investor's risk taking decision unaffected. Such a combination is called "neutral with respect to risk taking". Under a neutral tax system, the investor's individually optimal risk level would coincide with the one in the symmetric case. Thus, the neutrality condition is defined by: ( ) Because of v´(r * ) = 0, these partial derivatives are related as follows: Finally, we arrive at the following condition to ensure risk-taking-tax-neutrality: Our results indicate that the request for legal-form-tax-neutrality may be misleading as far as risk allocation is concerned. Under full liability, symmetric taxation is a necessary condition for tax neutrality with respect to risk taking. This result is intuitive, because under full liability, the investor participates equally in positive and negative returns. Only symmetric taxation keeps the resulting risk-return incentives intact.
For limited liability firms, in contrast, asymmetric taxation is necessary to maintain risk choice undistorted. The economic reason is given by the opposing effects of limited liability and loss-offset restrictions. Whereas limited liability increases the demand for risky investment, loss-offset limitations decrease investors' willingness to invest in risky projects.
For any given liability parameter β , there exists a unique loss-offset parameter γ which leaves risk taking undistorted compared to the symmetric case. As a consequence, if both policy action variables β and γ are variable, there is an infinite number of neutral − β γ combinations for each given set of tax rates s and ratios * Q .
From a tax policy perspective, it is problematic that every neutral − β γ combination depends on the ratio * Q , which must be determined individually for each risk-return function ( ) v r and each distribution of returns ( ) f ε . Although a neutral loss-offset parameter γ does exist for any given tax rate s and any given liability parameter β , it ensures neutrality only for an individual case rather than for a general setting. For other risk-return functions and other distributions of returns, the supposedly neutral − β γ combination will distort risk taking.
In any case, our results refute the proponents of legal-form-tax-neutrality. Our model clearly proves that firms with different liability parameters, i.e., incorporated and non-incorporated firms, must be subject to differential taxation if risk-taking-tax-neutrality is used as a tax policy objective. More generally, our model reveals an example of opposing partial tax neutralities.
Numerical examples

Tax effects
This section explains the effects of tax-and non-tax asymmetries using a simple distribution of the rates of return. Since the uniform distribution is probably the simplest continuous distribution function, it is adequate to illustrate the emerging effects. The probability density function is given by:
We need a symmetric distribution, because the expected value of the stochastic term should Thus, the expected rate of return in the optimum is strictly positive.
Assuming a uniform distribution yields the following auxiliary variables M and N and their partial derivatives with respect to r: (1 ) (1 ) 
be determined analytically, they are very complicated and cannot be interpreted in an economically meaningful way.
Numerical examples illustrate the substitution effect of limited liability and loss-offset restrictions derived above. We use the following assumptions:
• Tax rate: s=25%
• Risk-return function: Table 1 : Optimal risk levels depending on liability-and loss-offset parameters The tax rate also has a substantial impact on the neutral β -γ -combinations. Low tax rates result in low loss-induced tax reimbursements, whereas high tax rates aggravate the relevance of loss-offset restrictions. To compensate for the benefits of limited liability, low tax rates require a much more severe tax "punishment" of losses than high tax rates. Thus, for low tax rates, the risk-taking neutral γ can be dramatically lower than for high tax rates. This is illustrated in figure 8, . A higher risk level r increases the probability for default and enhances the relevance of limited liability. For a compensation of the resulting benefit to the investor, a denial of loss-offset or even a taxation of losses could be necessary. The higher the tax rate, the more likely it is that this compensation effect can be achieved within the range of traditional loss-offset methods.
Summary and conclusion
This paper analyzes the simultaneous incentives arising from asymmetric taxation and limited liability on optimal risk taking. We show that loss-offset restrictions reduce incentives for risk taking by inducing concavities in the investor's value function. By contrast, limited liability convexifies the investor's value function and encourages risk taking. The combined effects of asymmetric taxation and limited liability depend on the intensity of both components. An important result is the fact that risk-taking-tax-neutrality and legal-form-tax-neutrality are incompatible: Under full liability, risk-taking-tax-neutrality requires symmetric taxation of profits and losses, whereas asymmetric taxation is a necessary condition for risk-taking-taxneutrality under limited liability.
Again, these results reveal that legal-form-tax-neutrality -if defined simply as equal tax treatment of different legal forms -is at best irrelevant, but typically distorts risk taking decisions.
Although our model considers a risk-neutral investor only, we expect the results to remain qualitatively unchanged if risk-averse investors are taken into account. Compared to symmetric taxation, the basic incentives for risk taking induced by asymmetric taxation and limited liability are similar. Of course, the quantitative effects are different for risk-averse investors. However, it should be noted that symmetric taxation can increase risk taking compared to the pre-tax case under risk aversion 13 .
Our model is based on some ceteris paribus assumptions. For example, we assume the distribution of the rates of return to be independent of the liability parameter. Implicitly, this means that contractual partners of the investor are indifferent with respect to (or unaware of) whether the investor is subject to full liability. Alternatively, we could assume that the contractual partners adjust the terms to which they are willing to deal with the investor in accordance with the liability conditions. I.e., market participants would demand a risk premium in the case of limited liability. Of course, a risk premium would imply different market prices for investors with limited and full liability.
The existence of a risk premium means that identical risk levels taken by different investors are economically different if the investors are subject to different liability parameters. This does not speak against our type of analysis. Rather, this insight points to difficulties in defining tax neutrality if more and more changes of market processes are considered. As a result, the problem of risk transfer to contractual partners as well as the question of tax shifting must currently be regarded as unsolved. In principle, risk shifting and tax shifting could be modelled within a general equilibrium model. However, this approach requires assumptions about the risk preferences of all market participants. For reasons of feasibility, we use a partial model which excludes these problems.
In any case, accepting the risk premium argument would rather support our results concerning legal-form-tax-neutrality. If risk taking decisions under full and limited liability were economically different, differential taxation of different legal forms would not violate the principle of equitable taxation.
As a further caveat, our model requires detailed information about the distributions of investments' returns. Even among professional investors these distributions are known only in exceptional cases. Furthermore, the loss-offset-and liability parameters are investor-specific as well as investment-specific and cannot be directly observed from tax law or corporate law. Liability-induced risk shifting between market participants is unlikely to be observable, too. Hence, risk-taking-tax-neutrality should not be regarded as a realistic tax policy objective. At best, it can serve as a benchmark for revealing the allocative effects of fiscal policy. Therefore, our model serves as a starting point to analyze the interdependencies between limited liability and asymmetric taxation from a tax policy perspective.
